Since the industrialization of Europe in the mid-19th century, most commentators have shaped their visions of future war through the prism of technological innovation. At first, this trend was modified by strategic thinkers who, while accepting that the development of new weapons and their mass production with precision tools were changing tactics, argued for an underlying continuity in the principles of war and the strategies which shaped it. Before the First World War, Ferdinand Foch cited Napoleon when he taught at the École de guerre and Julian Corbett’s ideas on maritime strategy, propounded at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, drew their evidence from the age of sail.
For much of the late 20th century, it seemed reasonable to assume that religion was gradually receding from the center of international politics. Modernization theory anticipated a process of secularization and the experience of Western Europe in particular appeared to confirm that trajectory. As levels of religious affiliation and participation declined in parts of the North Atlantic world, it became easier to imagine that economic development, urbanization, and liberal democratic governance would progressively relocate religion to the private sphere. After the Cold War, this assumption was reinforced by a broader narrative of convergence: ideological rivalry had ended, and liberal democracy appeared not only institutionally durable but normatively ascendant.
Today’s leading technology companies exercise vast influence over the world order. Their outsized economic, political, informational, and cultural power shapes societies and the lives of individuals. Prominent scholars and policy analysts have described these tech firms as “new governors” that exercise novel forms of sovereignty in a world that is no longer unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar but rather “technopolar”.
In the Middle East, the issue of energy and climate change is characterized by superlatives. Home to the world’s major oil and gas reserves, the region produces a third of the oil consumed worldwide, although it faces increased competition, particularly from North American producers. It comprises states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar, which have some of the highest CO2 emissions per capita in the world. Their energy consumption continues to increase, supported by some of the highest fossil fuel subsidies in the world. Water consumption per capita is breaking records, and its primary source, desalination, is particularly energy intensive. Economic and demographic growth has given rise to growing national electricity needs. The region is also experiencing first-hand the impacts of global warming, as evidenced by increasing water stress. The amount of sunlight it receives offers huge potential for solar electricity production and could therefore offer a solution to this increased consumption, although currently the electricity mix is still largely dominated by fossil fuels. With the climate emergency growing stronger every day, and climate governance calling for countries to increase their nationally determined contributions ahead of COP26 at the end of 2020, how are the oil-producing states of the Middle East contemplating the diversification of their economies and energy systems? Do Saudi Arabia and the UAE, further exposed to strong geopolitical tensions, have realistic ambitions…
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