Each and every COP (Conference of the Parties) is heralded as “the last chance,” and 2021’s COP26 in Glasgow was no exception. But as the conference doors swung shut for another year, the media denounced it as a failure: it seemed as if the impressive ensemble of heads of state who had traveled to Scotland to attend the event had, once again, missed the opportunity to save the planet. But can 2022’s COP manage to achieve what 2021’s failed to? There’s one thing we can be sure of: COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh will once again be “the last chance.”
Since Joe Biden’s election there has been a sense of optimism around international climate negotiations. The hope of finding a multilateral solution will be revived in a few months’ time at the important COP26 summit in Glasgow, which should mark the end of another cycle of amendments to the 2030 commitments. In record time, the United States has not only rejoined the Paris climate agreement, but it has also presented the rest of the world with a plan to reduce its national emissions by 50–52% from their 2005 levels by 2030. That announcement came on April 22, 2021, during a major virtual summit organized by the White House. It was motivated by two goals: to demonstrate the credibility of the United States’ commitment to climate action, and to increase the diplomatic pressure on other large emitters, chief among them China, to follow the same path. Nevertheless, the figures are not encouraging. In 2020, the restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic caused the biggest drop in CO2 emissions (6%) since the Second World War, but that decline has been reversed since the resumption of trade and activity. Predictions for 2021 suggest a rebound of 5%, reflecting the lack of lasting structural change. To find reasons for hope, we must turn to the evolution of official discourse. At the end of 2019, European countries were more or less the only ones to have promised to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; that goal has now been adopted by two-thirds of the global economy, including the United States and China (by 2060)…
Cette recension croisée constitue la note de tête du numéro d’hiver 2022 de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2022). Hugo Le Picard, chercheur associé au Centre Énergie & Climat de l’Ifri, propose une analyse croisée des ouvrages de Edward Barbier, Economics for a Fragile Planet: Rethinking Markets, Institutions and Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2022, 250 pages), Peter N. Nemetz, Unsustainable World: Are We Losing the Battle to Save our Planet? (Routledge, 2022, 418 pages) et Kari De Pryck, GIEC, la voix du climat (Presses de Sciences Po, 2022, 326 pages).
L’apparition de la pandémie de Covid-19 a eu un impact profond sur les émissions mondiales de gaz à effet de serre, provoquant une baisse temporaire due au ralentissement de l’activité économique. Puis, à mesure que la virulence et la contagiosité du virus ont ralenti, l’activité économique internationale a repris, entraînant une ré-augmentation des émissions. À la fin de la pandémie, il semblait que le monde se dirigeait vers une transition énergétique accélérée : les pays représentant une importante part des émissions mondiales s’étaient engagés à une réduction plus rapide de leurs émissions de CO2 à l’occasion de la conférence de Glasgow.
Le déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine est cependant venu rappeler la forte dépendance de nos sociétés et de nos économies vis-à-vis des hydrocarbures. En restreignant l’approvisionnement en gaz du marché européen, les Russes ont créé un déficit d’approvisionnement sur un marché régional qui a eu des conséquences mondiales sur le prix du gaz et, par extension, sur les prix du baril. Les importants bouleversements des marchés mondiaux de l’énergie causés par l’invasion russe se sont dès lors mis en travers des politiques de lutte contre le réchauffement climatique.
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